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The purpose of the article is to illustrate the main characteristics of the corporate governance 
challenge facing the countries of South-Eastern Europe (SEE) and to subsequently determine and assess 
the extensiveness and effectiveness of corporate governance regulation in these countries.  
Therefore, we start with an overview on the subject of the key problems of corporate governance 
in transition. We then address the issue of corporate governance measurement for SEE countries. To this 
end, we include a review of the methodological framework for determining both the extensiveness and 
the effectiveness of corporate governance legislation, as defined by the EBRD and a discussion on aspects 
related to corporate governance development, the quality of corporate governance codes and of the law 
on the books. We then focus on the actual analysis of legal institutions effectiveness and provide a 
measure of corporate governance in Romania and other SEE emerging markets. The paper concludes by 
emphasizing the relationship between legal change and the development of financial markets in the SEE 
region. 
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1. Introduction  
Corporate governance has been a dominant policy issue in developed market 
economies for more than a decade. In the transition economies, it took some time for 
corporate governance to advance the ranking of policy priorities, but since the late 90s 
it became one of the most intensely debated issues.  
At least two set of events are responsible for the heightened interest in corporate 
governance. During the wave of financial crises in 1998 in Russia, Asia, and Brazil, 
deficiencies in corporate governance endangered the stability of the global financial 
system. Just three years later, confidence in the corporate sector was sapped by 
corporate governance scandals in the United States and Europe, which triggered some 
of the largest insolvencies in history.  The scandals and crises, however, are just 
manifestations of a number of structural reasons why corporate governance has become 
more important for economic development and a significant policy issue1, especially for 
transition economies in South-Eastern Europe (SEE)2, that do not have the long-
established (financial) institutional infrastructure to deal with corporate governance 
issues. 
Privatization has raised corporate governance issues in sectors that were 
previously in the hands of the state. Firms have turned to markets to seek capital, and 
mutual enterprises and partnerships have converted themselves into listed corporations.  
The private, market-based investment process is now becoming more substantial for 
most of these economies, being underpinned by better corporate governance. The role of 
institutional investors is growing in many of these countries, with economies moving 
away from pay as you go retirement systems. This increased delegation of investment 
has raised the need for corporate governance arrangements. 
Also, due to technological progress, liberalization and opening up of financial markets, 
trade liberalization, and other structural reforms, the allocation within and across 
countries of capital among competing purposes has become more complex, as has 
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monitoring of the use of capital. This has made good corporate governance more 
important, but also more difficult to achieve. 
Furthermore, programs of deregulation and reform have reshaped not only the local 
(SEE) financial landscape but also the European one. Long-standing institutional 
corporate governance arrangements are being replaced with new ones but, in the 
meantime, inconsistencies and gaps have emerged. 
European financial integration has increased, together with trade and investment flows. 
This has led to numerous cross-border issues in corporate governance.  
All these developments have enhanced the need for formulating corporate 
governance rules and have led to the adoption all over the world3 and by most of the 
SEE countries of corporate governance codes, as a measure of dealing with each 
countrys specific governance problems (besides international organizations efforts, 
such as the OECD corporate governance principles). These initiatives have recently 
resulted in improvements of formal legal rules, as well as in the drafting of soft-law 
recommendations. 
These sets of rules and regulations, whether international, national, or company-
specific, are all remarkably similar. As a common denominator they want to shape 
comprehensive standards of good governance. These are mainly the protection of 
minority shareholders, the avoidance of conflicts of interests and the request for 
disclosure and transparency4, the constitution of the boards (the issue of independent 
directors and supervisory board members), smaller boards to secure better coordination, 
the formation of monitoring, compensation and nomination committees, as well as the 
claim for one-share-one-vote5.  
Yet, corporate governance practices tend to differ quite substantially across countries 
and companies, especially among developed and transition economies in Europe, with 
some specific features for SEE economies, which explains the concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of corporate governance rules, especially in these countries. 
The general aim of this paper is to identify the specificities of the institutional 
environment in SEE countries and to subsequently determine and measure the 
extensiveness and effectiveness of corporate governance laws and regulations in these 
countries. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 identifies the key problems of 
corporate governance in transition. To do so, it describes some current features of the 
institutional environment in the South-Eastern European countries and subsequently 
identifies and analyzes the common and specific characteristics of the corporate 
governance issues facing these countries.  
Section 3 addresses the issue of corporate governance measurement for SEE countries, 
with an emphasis on Romania. To this end, its first part includes a review of the 
methodological framework for determining both the extensiveness and the effectiveness 
of corporate governance legislation, as defined by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). It also comprises a short overview on the 
subject of corporate governance development, the quality of corporate governance 
codes and of the law on the books. The second part focuses on the actual results of the 
assessment exercise, by supplementing the investigation so far with an analysis into the 
effectiveness of legal institutions as opposed to the law on the books and attempts to 
provide a measure of corporate governance in Romania and other SEE emerging 
markets. 
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Section 4 concludes, by emphasizing the relationship between legal change and the 
development of financial markets in the SEE region and identifies research issues that 
require further study. 
 
2. Specific corporate governance issues in the transition economies of SEE 
a. Key facts 
Although transition countries in SEE vary considerably in history and current 
institutional setup, they share certain important features. They all had and some still 
have quite a large sector of former state-owned enterprises, in the process of 
restructuring. In addition, these economies inherited a dysfunctional legal system, and in 
many cases they had to construct basic institutions from zero. 
Consequently, a useful prerequisite for the analysis of corporate governance in 
transition economies is a short review of corporate control issues under central 
planning.  
Enterprise structures in central planning were characterized by two distinctive features 
that have persistent influence until the present day6. First, budget constraints for 
socialist enterprises were soft: passive finance was provided under the central plan, so 
they did not have to worry about external financing. Hence, the concepts of financial 
discipline and accountability were essentially absent. Second, the state as the owner of 
most assets had a pervasive monitoring problem in trying to ensure that managers of 
socialist enterprises acted according to the targets set out by the central plan7.  
The two problems were closely inter-related. Absent the sanction of enforcing financial 
discipline by cutting off supplies and ultimately forcing an enterprise to close down, the 
problem of corporate control could never be resolved. 
When central planning was abolished, the lack of external financing became a serious 
constraint on enterprises. The problem of substituting government finance with new 
sources of external finance is thus very much at the heart of the problem of corporate 
governance and restructuring in transition. 
Parallel to the reduction of state financing, economic reforms in transition countries also 
fundamentally altered the structure of ownership rights through privatization.  
Starting in the mid 1990s, the corporate governance debate within transition economies 
revolved around specific privatization issues and initial efforts in the move toward 
responsible corporate governance included legislative, judicial and corporate initiatives 
to provide investors with more disclosure and transparent information8. 
However, in this endeavor governments were constrained by the power of incumbent 
managers, who had accumulated implicit control rights as a result of weak state 
monitoring under central planning. In many SEE economies, privatization simply led to 
the explicit recognition of these control rights through the allocation of ownership titles 
to insiders. Further, new outside owners were often dispersed and weak (particularly 
where voucher privatization prevailed). As a result, transition has in some instances 
created an extreme version of the two classical problems of corporate governance: on 
one hand the control of managers by dispersed outside owners and, on the other hand, 
the protection of minority shareholders against strong block-holder interests9.  
Against this background, external investors have been cautious in providing new 
capital, and restructuring efforts have been disappointing. Indeed, unchecked by owners 
and with little access to new funds to finance risky restructuring, managers faced 
incentives that were skewed towards asset stripping and expropriating minority 
shareholders10. 
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b. Major findings  
At the risk of simplification, the problem of corporate governance in the 
transition economies of SEE may thus be summarized as follows: 
o the persistence of the issue of soft budget constraints, coupled with difficulty in 
obtaining external financing11; 
o the remaining influence of the state over corporate decision-making through a nexus 
of subsidies, regulatory favors and tax arrears provided in exchange for residual 
control rights; 
o poor investor protection (especially minority), with an entrenched position of 
incumbent enterprise managers, who retain effective control rights even where 
privatization has shifted ownership to outsiders;  
o concentration of ownership that also undermines the liquidity of equity markets. 
Ownership and control are relatively closely held by identifiable and cohesive groups 
of insiders who have longer-term stable relationships with the company (i.e. 
families, banks, and workers). Furthermore, there is a strong dependency on banks, 
high debt/equity ratios and less developed capital markets. 
All these problems are closely intertwined. Enterprises will be unable to tap 
external sources of funds as long as they remain subject to extensive state intervention 
and/or insider control. Conversely, insider control will remain pervasive as long as 
potential investors are doubtful about the possible returns on their investments and 
refrain from acquiring substantial amounts of shares. And as long as enterprises are 
unable to survive on their own, the state will feel it is necessary to ensure the survival at 
least of key enterprises. 
With external funds accessible at reasonable costs, the need for state support would be 
reduced, which would lead to a change in the ownership structure of firms. New 
emissions would over time crowd out insiders who may also find it attractive to part 
with their current holdings, provided that outsiders are willing to offer a reasonable 
price. 
Table 1 gives an indication of where the SEE transition economies position themselves 
with respect to such a scenario. It shows the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, 
of stock trading volume as percentage of market capitalization and the private sector 
credit to GDP and respectively in 2005, in relation to a number of EU member countries 
(Central and Eastern European countries).  
 
Table 1. Development of capital markets, end 2004 
Country No of listed 
companies  
Mk. cap., 
mln. USD 
Stock mk. 
cap. as % of 
GDP 
Stock trading 
volume, mln. 
USD 
Stock trading 
volume as % 
of mk. cap. 
 Private 
sector credits 
as % of GDP 
Czech Republic 120 26 891 25 20 167 75 27 
Estonia 13 6 292 54 896 14 43 
Hungary 49 28 300 28 13 005 46 46 
Latvia 39 2 568 19 119 5 50 
Lithuania 43 6 423 29 424 7 25 
Poland 230 71 547 30 16 269 23 23 
Slovak Republic 302 3 919 10 750 19 26 
Slovenia 140 9 677 30 1 479 15 48 
Bulgaria 332 2 801 12 572 20 23 
Romania 4058 11 938 16 747 6 10 
Croatia 241 10 952 32 439 4 52 
Macedonia 146 413 8 86 21 18 
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 6 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina 1132 3 691 45 174 5 19 
Montenegro 211 313 13 21 7 - 
Serbia 406 3 281 15 435 13 - 
Source: World federation of Exchanges, EBRD Transition Report 2005, home pages of national 
exchanges 
 
Other specific corporate governance problems of the transition economies in 
SEE involve weaker legal systems and corruption. Of course, there are differences in 
the degree of these problems depending on the state of transition. 
Court delays, as a measure of contract enforceability are higher in Civil Law countries 
than in Common Law countries12. Most of the SEE transition countries have adopted a 
Civil Law system. According to the World Bank (2006), SEE economies are generally 
belonging to the group with very high court delays (especially Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Montenegro). Such delays therefore increase the costs of using courts 
for conflict resolution and deter foreign as well as domestic investors (highest costs for 
Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Furthermore, the transition economies of SEE have to deal with the problem of 
corruption. The corruption perception index (CPI) compiled at the University of 
Passau13 relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, 
academics and risk analysts. It ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
The 15 Member States before the enlargement were ranked within the top 25 of this 
survey (with 109 countries). Portugal, with a CPI score of 6.6 was ranked 25th. With 
scores ranging from 2.4 to 3.4, the SEE states are significantly more corrupt (or at least 
seen as more corrupt by market participants) than their European partners (see table 2).  
 
Table 2. Democracy, economic development and legal reform, 2005 
 GDP per 
capita, USD 
Population, 
mln. 
Voice and 
accountability 
Rule of 
law 
Freedom House 
Classif. 
CPI 
Czech Republic 19 311 10.2 1.03 0.69 Free 4.3 
Estonia 13 740 1.4 1.13 0.91 Free 6.4 
Hungary 16 596 10.1 1.16 0.85 Free 5 
Latvia 11 962 2.3 0.96 0.48 Free 4.2 
Lithuania 12 994 3.4 0.97 0.60 Free 4.8 
Poland 12 786 38.2 1.13 0.51 Free 3.4 
Slovak Republic 14 549 5.4 1.10 0.49 Free 4.3 
Slovenia 20 853 2.0 1.12 0.93 Free 6.1 
Bulgaria 8 026 7.8 0.58 0.05 Free 4 
Romania 8 413 21.7 0.36 -0.18 Free 3 
Croatia 12 336 4.4 0.46 0.07 Free 3.4 
Macedonia 6 767 2.0 -0.02 -0.44 Partly 2.7 
Albania 4 929 3.2 0.03 -0.80 Partly 2.4 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 7 168 3.8 -0.14 -0.76 Partly 2.9 
Montenegro 3 800 0.6 0.12 -0.72 Free 2.8 
Serbia 4 400 8.3 0.12 -0.72 Free 2.8 
Legend: Voice and accountability index is a measure of political, civil and human rights  higher scores 
indicate higher democracy; Rule of law index is a measure of the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, courts and the likelihood of crime and violence 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2005, Freedom House, Transparency International 
 
Consequently, the predominant corporate governance problem in the transition 
economies of SEE could be summarized as frequent insider control, difficult outside 
finance. While hardened budgetary constraints and improved investor protection could 
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have an effect on investment decisions, the prevailing issue in most of these countries 
seems to be enforcement or the effectiveness of corporate governance regulations.  
 
3. Measuring corporate governance in the SEE countries  
3.1. Conceptual issues  the research method 
Corporate governance codes are in general not mandatory regulations and 
therefore it is optional for companies to adhere to them. The situation changes if codes 
are becoming listing requirements at stock markets or formal legal rules by the 
legislators, which we can observe in many European countries (such as the UK or 
Germany).  
Most SEE transition economies (with the exception of Romania, where a 
corporate governance code has been issued by the stock exchange in 2003) have 
adopted a corporate governance code. Whereas we can find differences within the scope 
of the codes, they have in common that they abide closely by the OECD Principles. 
Given the characteristics of the corporate governance systems institutional 
surrounding in SEE transition economies and the specific corporate governance 
problems in these countries, formal legal rules which may arise from such codes cannot 
rely only on a basis of broad minimum standards14, as it is often the case in the 
developed economies, but on binding legislation (mainly directives15 adopted in the 
harmonization process), that can at least partially reduce the existent shortcomings.   
The level of compliance of specific legislation with international standards and 
best practices is defined by the EBRD as extensiveness (law on the books) and is 
estimated in respect of corporate governance regulations proclaimed into law.  
In order to analyze the corporate governance related legislation of each country, the 
EBRD created a questionnaire based upon the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance: (1) rights of shareholders; (2) equitable treatment of shareholders; (3) role 
of stakeholders in corporate governance; (4) disclosure and transparency; and (5) 
responsibilities of the board. Based upon the assessment results of individual countries, 
a rating system has been developed to show how countries have progressed in the 
corporate governance area.  
Effectiveness (law in action), on the other hand, looks at how the legal 
regimes work in practice, as opposed to the quality of the law on the books.  
Changes in the legislation say little about the effectiveness of the new laws; this 
depends on the voluntary compliance rate on the one hand, and on the effectiveness of 
legal institutions that are charged with enforcing the law, on the other. Both are 
mutually reinforcing.  
We use an index of the effectiveness of corporate, banking and capital market law in 
transition economies, constructed by the EBRD, to measure the actual enforcement of 
regulations in SEE economies.  
The effectiveness index is taken from the EBRD Transition Reports, which use survey 
data to rank countries according to the effectiveness of legal reforms (speed, simplicity, 
enforceability and the institutional environment have been used as measures for the 
effectiveness of disclosure and redress mechanisms).  
 
3.2. Research results 
a. The extensiveness of corporate governance legislation in SEE  law on the books  
 
Table 3. Corporate governance development in SEE countries 
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Country 
Set of rules that serve 
as a national code of 
CG 
Proponent of the 
National code of 
CG 
Extent of compliance 
with OECD principles 
Existing code - mandatory or 
voluntary 
Albania Company Law (1992). Government It is not in line with OECD principles It is fully mandatory 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
Law on Banks and Law 
on Business Companies Government 
Law on Business 
Companies and Law on 
Banks are based on the 
OECD principles. 
Law on Business Companies and 
Law on Banks are mandatory. 
Bulgaria Law for Public Offering of Securities 
The national code 
is developed by 
the Government 
and is adopted by 
the National 
Assembly. 
The existing law is 
based on the OECD 
Principles. 
The existing code is mandatory. 
Croatia Croatian Company Law 
Enacted by the 
Parliament and 
proposed by the 
Government 
Croatian Company Law 
closely resembles the 
German Law model on 
CG and EU directives 
There are provisions in the 
Croatian Company Law which are 
mandatory. However, certain 
matters may be regulated by the 
company articles of association 
Macedonia 
Company Code and the 
Rules of the Stock 
Exchange 
Mainly by the 
Government. 
OECD principles are 
highly respected 
The corporate governance rules 
are to a great extent mandatory. 
Serbia & 
Montenegro 
Law on Enterprises and 
Law on Securities and 
other financial 
instruments market 
By the 
Government. 
The future code will be 
in accordance with 
OECD principles 
Both laws are mandatory 
Romania 
Such a national code 
does not exist. 
Corporate governance is 
observed according to 
provisions in the 
Companies Law, the 
Securities Law and 
NSCs and BSEs 
regulations and 
procedures 
The private sector 
promotes and 
develops 
principles related 
to corporate 
governance, but 
such principles are 
not promoted on a 
government level 
The existing Code of 
Corporate Governance 
issued by the BSE is, to 
a certain extent, 
inspired by the OECD 
principles 
The Corporate Governance Code 
issued by the BSE is mandatory 
only for the companies listed as 
members of the "plus tier" of the 
BSE.  
 
Source: own compilation, based on EBRD legal sector assessment, 2004 
 
Two comments can be made in relation to recent CG developments as described 
in Table 3.   
First, while EU accession countries might be performing better in terms of 
economic transition, they do not always have better "laws on the books" than other non-
accession countries. This observation is supported by the 2005 country ratings 
calculated by EBRD16 (high compliance  Macedonia; medium compliance  Albania, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro; low compliance - Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Romania). 
One possible explanation is that the EU accession process itself focuses on the 
harmonization of national laws with the EU acquis and accordingly better corporate 
governance regimes can be considered as a side effect of harmonization (but not as a 
goal for EU accession purposes). The fact that the European Commission has recently 
decided to take a more direct and organized approach in tackling corporate governance 
issues within the EU further supports this explanation and has a more direct 
consequence on the new acceding countries legislative framework. 
The second comment is related to the evolving EU legislation and, consequently, 
permanent harmonization process for the EU accession. Over the years, a dilemma 
constantly facing accession countries was that while they were endeavoring to establish 
a "EU compatible" regulatory framework at the national level, the relevant EU norms 
themselves were not standing still and the global economic environment in which 
countries were trying to thrive was also changing very fast. If we take Romania as an 
 8
example, throughout the accession process it was not uncommon to see a piece of 
legislation adopted only in the previous year being amended to include new relevant EU 
regulations (company law in December 2006 and securities law in July 2004, for 
example). Therefore, for the countries which joined the EU in 2007, the high level of 
harmonization anxiety resulted in more recent efforts put into the legislative process in 
order to comply with the provisions of the EU Action Plan on corporate governance17.  
With respect to the five dimensions of CG that, according to the EBRD, define 
its extensiveness, the table below confirms the empirical findings outlined above, 
meaning that major problems of the SEE countries are evidenced in the disclosure and 
transparency sector and in the rights of shareholders sector, with specific reference 
to control arrangements and control disclosure.  
In Romanias case, the major failings in the observance of the OECD corporate 
governance principles were identified in the areas of the responsibilities of the board 
and disclosure and transparency. 
 
Table 4.  Level of compliance with OECD principles on CG 
 Rights of 
shareholders 
Equitable 
treatment of 
shareholders 
Role of 
Stakeholders 
Disclosure & 
Transparency 
Responsibilities 
of the board 
Central Europe 
and the Baltics 
70 83 79 62 70 
South Eastern 
Europe 
72 78 63 52 72 
Source: own compilation, based on EBRD legal sector assessment, 2004    
 
b. The effectiveness of corporate governance legislation in SEE  law in action 
The results of the legal indicator survey conducted by the EBRD in 2005 (aimed 
at measuring the effectiveness of disclosure and redress mechanisms18 - see figure 1) 
indicate that:  
- as far as disclosure is concerned, South-Eastern Europe is generally characterized by 
the persistence of a complex legal framework, limited competence and experience of 
institutions and limited availability and use of case law (with an especially weak 
institutional environment in Albania, but relatively sound in Bulgaria, Croatia and more 
recently Romania) and with difficult enforcement of judicial decisions (the average time 
needed to obtain a court order varies from a few months in Bulgaria and Romania to 
three or more years in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A relatively effective framework for 
disclosure was reported in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro; 
- with respect to redress mechanisms, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro have the 
most effective legislation in the SEE region. Major weaknesses consist in long periods 
of time needed for obtaining an executable judgment (the average time needed varies 
from 18 months in Romania, to two years in Bulgaria and more than five years in Serbia 
and Montenegro), complex legal proceedings and a weak institutional environment 
(Bulgaria offers only one course of legal redress, while in Romania and Serbia and 
Montenegro, minority shareholders can choose between several different procedures 
which are generally deemed clear and enforceable) 
A clearer picture on Romanias situation is presented in table 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 9
Figure 1. Effectiveness of CG legislation in SEE  
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Source: own compilation, based on EBRD legal indicator survey, 2005 
 
Table 5. Effectiveness of CG legislation in Romania (58%)  
Disclosure refers to a minority shareholders ability to obtain information about their 
company. 
68.25% 
Speed   61% 
Simplicity   78% 
Enforceability  72% 
Institutional environment refers to the capacity of a countrys legal framework to effectively implement 
and enforce CG legislation 
62% 
Redress refers to the remedies available to a minority shareholder whose rights have 
been breached. 
47.8% 
Speed   38% 
Simplicity   48% 
Enforceability  77% 
Institutional environment  37% 
Costs refer to estimated expenses a minority shareholder must pay to take legal action 39% 
Source: own compilation, based on EBRD legal indicator survey, 2005 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Taken together, the two assessments (of the extensiveness and the effectiveness) 
provide a multi-dimensional view of the quality of corporate governance legislation and 
the functioning of legal regimes in the SEE countries. The conclusive results, under the 
form of the enforcement gap, are illustrated below (see figure 2). 
Several general conclusions can be drawn from this assessment:  
- first, the quality of the legal framework on corporate governance is improving in all 
countries, but its implementation is lagging behind.  Countries that have developed a 
solid institutional environment can generally offer an effective legal framework 
(Romania, Croatia). Nevertheless, good laws on the books are not enough to guarantee 
the effectiveness of a system. The sound environment needs to be coupled with a 
corporate governance framework in line with international standards and with an 
effective civil and/or administrative procedural framework; 
- second, recent EU member states (Bulgaria, Romania) and candidate countries 
(Croatia, Macedonia), while displaying a better institutional environment, do not 
systematically outperform other transition countries with regard to the effectiveness of 
disclosure or redress mechanisms; 
- third, the existence of implementation gaps undermines the usefulness of legal 
provisions and diminishes the confidence of foreign investors in the legal system as a 
whole. Consequently, most SEE countries, while still needing to upgrade their 
corporate, banking and stock market legislation, should also focus on implementing and 
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understanding the utility of this legislation in practice, in order to provide an explicit 
signal for investors that are essential for the development of their financial markets. 
 
Figure 2. Enforcement gap 
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Source: own compilation based on EBRD Transition Report 2005 
 
The most important conclusion of this paper is that a key aspect of weak 
corporate governance in SEE countries  namely the difficulty in attracting external 
finance  cannot be solved only by improvements, however radical, in the CG legal 
framework The extent of legal reform in these areas of the law has been impressive by 
any standard. In fact, many of the SEE countries, which received foreign legal technical 
assistance, can today boast higher levels of investor rights protection on the books than 
some of the most developed market economies19. Yet, the development of the law has 
not been matched so far by the development of financial markets. An important 
constraint on financial market development is the absence of effective legal institutions, 
or what we have termed effectiveness. Improving the law on the books in such an 
environment is at best a partial solution, but will not be rewarded unless a commitment 
to rule-based governance of markets is made credible. 
In their analysis of law and finance around the world, LLSV (1998)20 show that 
effective law enforcement is not a substitute for poor laws on the books. The situation of 
SEE economies indicates that the reverse can also be considered as valid: the existence 
of laws cannot substitute for weak institutions. 
Recent studies on transition economies have emphasized the relevance of law, 
judicial efficiency, corporate governance and the regulatory framework. Empirical 
evidence suggests that better legal protection of outside shareholders is associated with 
higher valuation of listed firms21. Consequently, a further area of investigation might be 
to test the correlation between the enforcement of financial regulations (e.g. security 
market supervision) and the stock markets performance.  
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